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Fluid teams are commonly used by a variety of organizations to perform similar and repetitive yet highly 
critical and knowledge-intensive tasks. Such teams operate for a limited time, after which they dissolve and 
some of their members may work together again as part of another team. Using a granular dataset of 6,206 
cardiac surgeries from a private hospital in Europe over seven years, our study offers a new and detailed 
account of how team familiarity (i.e., shared work experience) influences team productivity. We highlight the 
role of nuanced team composition dynamics beyond average team familiarity. We observe that teams with 
high dispersion of pairwise familiarity exhibit lower team productivity, and the existence of a “bottleneck-
pair” may significantly hinder overall knowledge transfer capability, thus, productivity of fluid teams. In 
addition, we find that the higher the percentage of familiarity gained from complex tasks, the higher the 
productivity of the team. Finally, our results suggest that the positive effect of average team familiarity on 
productivity is enhanced when performing more complicated tasks. Our study provides new operational 
insights to improve productivity of fluid teams with better team composition strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
The modus operandi of many of today’s organizations in knowledge-intensive environments is to 
employ fluid teams (Bushe and Chu 2011, Huckman et al. 2009, Edmondson and Nembhard 2009). One 
can observe fluid teams in a variety of settings, from scientific research collaborations and management 
consulting teams to surgical teams, flight crews, and product development teams. Fluid teams have a 
number of unique characteristics: They have no permanent memberships, they operate as a team only 
for a limited time or for a specific task, and they normally have clear hierarchies, roles, and task 
responsibilities. After their job is over, these teams dissolve, but many members may work again with 
each other on a new task as part of another team (Cohen and Bailey 1997, Paletz and Schunn 2011).  
A key management challenge that is particularly pertinent to fluid team operations is team 
composition. If individuals operate as part of a team only temporarily, how should they be assigned to 
various teams to make sure that these teams can perform their tasks more efficiently and hence achieve 
higher productivity over time? Our study seeks to address this question by focusing on a major element 
of team composition: team familiarity (i.e., shared work experience among team members).  
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Previous research has identified team familiarity as an important performance driver for teams 
with a primary focus on the role of average team familiarity (e.g., average of pairs’ familiarity). This 
line of work reported mostly beneficial effects (Edmondson 1999, Reagans et al. 2005, Huckman et al. 
2009, Huckman and Staats 2011) with the exception of two studies which suggested diminishing returns 
in the long run (Katz 1982, Berman et al. 2002).  
Despite these studies, several important questions regarding the effect of team familiarity on team 
productivity have remained unaddressed. First, previous research has mainly focused on the role of the 
first moment of familiarity distribution among team members (i.e., average familiarity) and has not 
accounted for two important distributional characteristics that go beyond team averages: (i) dispersion 
of familiarity among team members (e.g., the second moment), and (ii) existence of a bottleneck pair 
in the team (e.g., similar to the third moment capturing the skewness of the lowest familiar pair). Fluid 
teams are composed of members who have various levels of shared work experience in different pairs, 
and hence teams’ familiarity distributions might be substantially different despite having similar 
average familiarity levels. Indeed, a key characteristic of a distribution such as dispersion constitutes 
an inherent property of every team-level mechanism (De Jong and Dirks 2012). As a result, any model 
that solely focuses on team averages and neglects important distributional properties can lead to biased 
and ambiguous results for the examined phenomenon (Cole et al. 2011). Consequently, we first examine 
how team familiarity dispersion and the existence of bottleneck pairs might influence productivity of 
fluid teams. Team familiarity dispersion and bottleneck enrich our understanding of familiarity because 
they capture distinct team level characteristics that are undefined at the individual or pair level, and they 
only emerge at the team level. Next, inspired by the concept of “bottleneck” in traditional operations 
settings which limits a system’s capacity; we define and identify an analogous construct “bottleneck-
pair” for fluid teams. We argue that the existence of a pair with very low shared experience-compared 
to the average familiarity of the team, may act as a bottleneck for the team. It is worth noting that 
although the most famous example of a bottleneck in the operations management literature is a person 
(i.e., Herbie in the hiking track) (Goldratt and Cox 1984), there is little work that relates system 
bottleneck with persons and teams (Boudreau et al. 2003).  
Second, although previous studies have examined various contingent factors about the effect of 
team familiarity on team performance such as geographic dispersion and team size (Espinosa et al. 
2007), interpersonal diversity in terms of customer experience (Huckman and Staats 2011), and 
hierarchical roles (Staats 2012), this line of research has not examined the role of task type (i.e., 
complexity) on the relationship between team familiarity and productivity. On this front, we examine 
two important questions. First, does familiarity gained from a higher ratio of complex tasks result in 
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higher productivity? Second, how does complexity of the focal task moderate the relationship between 
team familiarity and productivity? These questions are also important from a practical viewpoint 
because fluid teams essentially perform related but not identical jobs over time which may significantly 
differ in terms of complexity (e.g., consider flight crews or surgical teams where each surgery or flight 
is different in complexity depending on patient or weather conditions).  
Overall, in this study, we focus on four questions related to familiarity in fluid teams. We first 
look at the distribution of familiarity among team members by examining (i) the effect of team 
familiarity dispersion, and (ii) the existence of a bottleneck pair on productivity. We then focus on task 
complexity and investigate (iii) whether familiarity gained from a higher percentage of complex tasks 
in the past provide higher productivity benefits, and (iv) whether a more complex focal task is more 
conducive for the positive effects of team familiarity on productivity.  
We test our hypotheses using a unique dataset of 6,206 cardiac surgeries from the cardiac unit of 
a private hospital in Europe over 87 months. With clear team member roles and responsibilities, limited 
team durations, and repeated interactions among individuals as part of different teams, our setting is 
ideal to investigate fluid teams (Edmondson et al. 2001). In addition, the presence of similar and 
repetitive, yet highly critical and complex tasks make cardiac operations a very suitable context to 
examine the role of team composition on productivity. Our results indicate that teams with high 
dispersion of pairwise familiarity exhibit lower team productivity (i.e., higher surgery duration), and 
the existence of a “bottleneck-pair” may significantly reduce productivity. In addition, we observe that 
the higher the percentage of familiarity gained from complex tasks, the higher the productivity of the 
team.  Finally, our results suggest that the positive effect of average team familiarity on productivity is 
amplified when performing more complex tasks.  
Our paper offers important contributions to operations management literature. Identifying team 
composition as a major apparatus with which managers can influence productivity; our study provides 
insights on effective management of fluid team operations. By examining nuanced factors beyond 
average team familiarity; our study unravels when and how team familiarity influences productivity of 
fluid teams. An important focus in the operations management literature has been to increase 
productivity at the individual, team and organizational level, though for mostly repetitive and routine 
tasks in contexts such as manufacturing or blue-collar work (Hopp and Spearman 2000, Hopp et al. 
2009). A natural extension and focus for this line of work is to study productivity in more knowledge 
intensive and more complex settings (Hopp et al. 2009). As Peter Drucker famously noted (1999, p. 79) 
“the most important, and indeed the truly unique, contribution of management in the 20th century was 
the 50-fold increase in the productivity of the manual worker in manufacturing. The most important 
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contribution management needs to make in the 21st century is similarly to increase the productivity of 
knowledge work and knowledge workers.”  
In the next section we present the existing literature and develop our hypotheses. We then present 
our data and results, robustness checks, and finally discuss our findings and conclusions.  
2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
Team familiarity (i.e., prior shared work experience) and its performance implications have been 
studied in several literatures. A number of theoretical studies have suggested positive effects of past 
collaborations (i.e. team familiarity) on team performance by highlighting the role of transactive 
memory system (Wegner 1986), collective mind (Weick and Roberts 1993), team human capital 
(Chillemi and Gui 1997), team psychological safety (Edmondson 1999), among others. In healthcare 
research, focusing on cardiac surgery team members, Fleming et al. (2006) suggested that limited shared 
experience may lead to breakdowns in communication, decision making and leadership which in turn 
may threaten surgical safety. Using data from pediatric, cardiac, and orthopedic operations, Catchpole 
et al. (2007) also showed that shared experience and effective teamwork during surgery can prevent 
minor problems from escalating and becoming serious threats for patients. Finally, examining 
general/vascular surgery services, Davenport et al. (2007) suggested that past collaborations can help 
decrease patient morbidity. Broader management literature has generally highlighted beneficial effects 
of team familiarity on productivity in various empirical settings including software teams (Faraj and 
Sproull 2000, Huckman et al. 2009) and surgery teams (Reagans et al. 2005); although some scholars 
have highlighted diminishing returns of team familiarity (Berman et al. 2002, Katz 1982). 
Previous studies have also explored more subtle effects of team familiarity. Espinosa et al. (2007) 
showed that in software development, team size and geographic dispersion interact positively with team 
familiarity resulting in increased team productivity. Huckman and Staats (2011) found that the 
interaction between team familiarity and interpersonal diversity in terms of customer experience results 
in significant improvement in effort and schedule deviation. Also in software teams, Staats (2012) 
observed that horizontal familiarity increase quality whereas hierarchical familiarity promotes 
productivity.  
Familiarity Dispersion 
While average team familiarity is an appropriate construct to characterize average levels of prior shared 
work experience in a team, it may not give us the complete picture with regards to team composition 
and familiarity dynamics in fluid teams. In such settings in which teams are not stable, there may be a 
high degree of variation both across and within teams in terms of team members’ familiarity between 
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each other. Moreover, two teams with the same levels of average team familiarity may differ 
substantially in their composition dynamics (e.g., one team with all members moderately familiar with 
each other, another team in which some pairs highly familiar and other pairs barely familiar with each 
other).  
In fact, previous research has pointed out the importance of including dispersion (e.g., diversity) 
while examining team-level effects (Harrison and Klein 2007, Jackson et al. 2003). Klein and 
Kozlowski (2000) suggested that most group constructs come from a combination of mean and 
dispersion mechanisms. Indeed, mean and dispersion have been treated as equal properties for the 
formation of team-level constructs such as trust and peer monitoring (De Jong and Dirks 2012), leader-
member exchange (Liao et al. 2010) and satisfaction (Dineen et al. 2007). Building on this literature, 
we argue that team familiarity dispersion may hinder team productivity through two main mechanisms.  
First, while common experience makes individuals aware of each other’s expertise and therefore 
leads to more efficient task allocation and knowledge sharing (Faraj and Sproull 2000, Lewis 2003, 
Reagans et al. 2005), when similar levels of familiarity are not shared by all individuals within the team, 
they will face difficulties in knowledge sharing and effective integration. This is due to different beliefs 
and lack of past collaboration among some members, which will in turn lower productivity (Gardner et 
al. 2012). Moreover, when relational resources are concentrated within parts of the same team, 
individuals will develop stronger bonds only with some team members, creating distance from others 
(Hornsey and Hogg 2000, Van Knippenberg et al. 2004). This uneven distribution may lead to 
opposition in task-related goals (Bezrukova et al. 2007), and conflict and distrust among team members 
(Choi and Sy 2010). Consequently, familiarity dispersion will result in lower productivity because of 
the unevenly distributed relational resources within the team. 
Second, trust among co-workers has been recognized as an important performance driver for 
healthcare personnel (Cook 2013), and its significance has been highlighted for individuals (e.g. nurses, 
Altuntas and Baykal 2010) as well as pairs in teams (such as between a surgeon and a nurse, Pullon 
2008). Trust is particularly critical for performance in high pressure settings (Colquitt et al. 2011) such 
as cardiac operations (Tucker and Edmondson 2003, Nembhard and Edmondson 2006), and a key 
enabler of trust among team members is prior shared experience (Gruenfeld et al. 1996, Edmondson 
1999). As a result, high familiarity dispersion indicates high trust variance and trust asymmetry within 
the team, which will have negative effects on team productivity due to unbalanced social exchange 
structures that inhibit reciprocation of resources (De Jong and Dirks 2012). Within a team, while 
individuals are likely to share information and adopt shared information with highly familiar and hence 
trusted members, they are less likely to do so with less familiar members (Kane et al. 2005, Gardner et 
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al. 2012). This will in turn result in inefficient knowledge sharing within the team. Individuals may 
refrain from seeking help and advice from less familiar members of the team who may have the right 
information and who may be more capable than highly familiar members (Hoffman et al. 2009, Gardner 
et al. 2012), resulting in decreased productivity. We therefore predict that:       
Hypothesis 1: Team familiarity dispersion has a negative impact on team productivity.  
Familiarity and Bottlenecks 
In production settings, bottlenecks are highly important as they constrain the system capacity. They are 
also fundamental in determining throughput, cycle time, customer service, and other performance 
metrics (Hopp et al. 2009). Despite their significant influence on performance, and their obvious 
connotations in knowledge intensive environments, only a small number of studies have highlighted 
“bottlenecks” in white-collar settings. Taking the concept of bottleneck to team settings and employing 
social network analysis, Cross et al. (2001) suggested that some team members may be acting as 
‘bottlenecks’ in sharing information, resulting in the whole team to operate less efficiently. Siemsen et 
al. (2008) used the motivation-opportunity-ability (MOA) framework to show that one of these three 
factors can act as a bottleneck and therefore determine the degree of knowledge sharing among members 
of a workgroup.  
Because the smallest unit in a team that exchange information is a pair, and our conceptualization 
of team familiarity is based on pairwise prior shared work experience, we suggest that the existence of 
a pair with very low levels of shared work experience (i.e., familiarity) compared to average familiarity 
of the team may act as a bottleneck for the whole team’s operation, and thus reduce productivity. There 
are several reasons for such an effect. First, emphasizing the role of pairs in a team, Bion (1962) 
suggested that cohesion will develop easier between two individuals than among all group members. 
One of the initial consequences of prior shared work experience is the development of cohesion 
(Hackman 1987, Evans and Dion 1991). We argue that the existence of a bottleneck-pair in terms of 
team familiarity will result in a lack of basic levels of cohesion in that pair, hence constraining some of 
the members’ effective willingness to engage in a relationship and share information within the team, 
thus negatively influencing team’s productivity. 
Second, groups and pairs, similar to individuals, can develop habitual routines (Gersick and 
Hackman 1990) and norms (Feldman 1984). When members have previous common experience, they 
share a priori premise about the way they should proceed in a given situation (Gersick and Hackman 
1990). Bottleneck-pairs which are in significant shortage of habitual routines would need explicit 
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communication about the task itself (Gersick and Hackman 1990, Espinosa et al. 2007) which will in 
turn reduce productivity of the team. 
In addition, an important consequence of team familiarity is to reduce communication errors by 
reducing uncertainty among them (Harrison et al. 2003). Members who form the bottleneck pair (i.e., 
with limited familiarity with compare to others), however, will have uncertainty about each other, 
producing higher anxiety (Gruenfeld et al. 1996). This may in turn reduce the fluency of individuals 
(Nemeth 1986), resulting in higher likelihood of communication errors. Because communication errors 
among surgical team members are the most common cause of operative problems (Makary et al. 2006), 
and such errors in one pair can be sufficient to cause operative problems and ineffectiveness for the 
whole surgery, we suggest that the existence of a bottleneck pair will increase the likelihood of 
communication errors, thus, reduce team productivity.  
Finally, cardiac operations consist of a set of steps performed by pairs of the surgical team (KC 
and Staats 2012) in which tacit knowledge plays a critical role (Edmondson et al. 2003) in smooth 
performance of these tasks. Because familiarity promotes formation of tacit knowledge among 
individuals and pairs (Edmondson et al. 2003, Huckman and Pisano 2006) and transferring tacit 
knowledge is also inherently difficult due to the contextualized nature of the knowledge itself (Joshi et 
al. 2007), the bottleneck pair will have difficulty in information sharing. Since the entire surgery is a 
sequence of steps and operations, and the outcome of the whole team depends on the effort of each pair 
and individual in the team (Hollingshead 2001); the lack of efficient information sharing in one step 
(i.e, by the bottleneck pair) will have a cascading effect on other steps, which will result in reduced 
productivity for the whole team. As a result, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: The existence of a bottleneck-pair has a negative impact on team productivity.    
Notice that, although team familiarity dispersion and bottleneck-pair are somewhat related, we 
contend that they are two distinct theoretical concepts. While the existence of a bottleneck pair (i.e., a 
pair with very low familiarity compared to the average familiarity of the team) may indicate high 
dispersion, the opposite is not true. A high dispersion can be caused by one or two pairs that are highly 
familiar compared to the other pairs in the team. This does not necessarily mean that there will be a 
bottleneck pair. They are therefore distinct concepts that capture two important characteristic of 
familiarity distribution within a team.  
Gaining Familiarity 
We next consider productivity implications of the way team familiarity is gained. Members in a fluid 
team inevitably gain familiarity as they perform tasks and work together as part of a team, but in 
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developing this familiarity, the nature of tasks that they perform together could be quite different. This 
may lead to differentiated effects in future task productivity. Consider two similar surgical teams both 
performing a single operation. Members of both teams will develop familiarity within their teams, but 
if one team has performed a simple routine operation, whereas the other one has performed a high risk 
complicated operation, the nature of gained familiarity as a result of performing these operations could 
be quite different. Consequently, their impact on subsequent operations’ productivity will be different, 
too. 
Development of a transactive memory system, which involves a representation of who knows 
what in a team (Lewis 2003) enhances task performance (Wegner 1986). Furthermore, experience from 
more complex tasks promote more efficient development of a transactive memory resulting in better 
encoding, storage, retrieval, and communication of information (Brandon and Hollingshead 2004). As 
a result, we expect team members to develop better transactive memory systems through working on 
more complex tasks, leading to higher productivity in subsequent operations.  
In addition, team members working on challenging, non-routine tasks which require increased 
coordination and communication, will relate better to each other by forming cognitive interdependence 
(Levine and Moreland 1999, Moreland 1999).  As a result, team members will realize that the outcome 
of their effort does not depend solely on them but it also depends on other group members (Hollingshead 
2001). This realization will bring about better information sharing and knowledge transfer among group 
members (Brandon and Hollingshead 2004) in subsequent tasks, and therefore, improve productivity. 
Finally, cardiac surgeries are characterized by high levels of uncertainty and pressure because 
the stakes are high (Tucker and Edmondson 2003). Under conditions of uncertainty, working on simple 
tasks with low information processing requirements can be decreasingly effective (Tushman and Nadler 
1978). As such, if familiarity is gained through mostly simple tasks, we expect limited productivity 
benefits. In contrast, if familiarity is gained by performing a high ratio of complex tasks which 
inherently require better information sharing and coordination (Gittel 2002), we expect higher 
cohesiveness and productivity in succeeding operations. Considering all of the above points, we expect: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the ratio of familiarity which is gained from complex tasks in the past, 
the higher the productivity of the team. 
Familiarity and Task Nature 
Team members who are highly familiar with each other can communicate more effectively since they 
can refer to the same technical terminology (Cramton 2001), identify and access expertise more 
effectively (Faraj and Sproull 2000), and generally know what to expect from each individual, and how 
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that can be used to promote team productivity. As a result, when a setting makes it harder for a team to 
locate specialized knowledge and access expertise, team familiarity can have an increased benefit for 
the team (Espinosa et al. 2007). That is, we expect the positive relationship between team familiarity 
and productivity to be amplified when performing more complicated tasks.  
We argue that benefits of team familiarity become more prominent during more complex and 
uncertain tasks. Such benefits include reducing the need for explicit interactions (Espinosa et al. 2007), 
reducing uncertainty about team members (Harrison et al. 2003), and enabling them to figure out more 
efficient ways to work with each other without the need of extensive interactions (Campbell 1988). 
Team familiarity also enables team members to deal with variation by applying knowledge gained 
through their past collaborations (Banker et al. 2001, Field and Sinha 2005), and it may help develop 
adaptability (Van de Ven et al. 1976, Gittel 2002). We therefore expect team familiarity to have a 
stronger effect on productivity in environments with high uncertainty. Complex operations are 
characterized by higher levels of uncertainty and they have an increased probability of adverse events. 
We therefore expect team familiarity to have stronger effects on productivity during these operations. 
Especially in the operating room, where “you look at the surgeon and you know the body language and 
you act” (Edmondson et al. 2003, p.221), the influence of team familiarity on productivity will be more 
prominent during more complex tasks. Also, team members demonstrate higher cognitive alertness 
when performing complex tasks (Levine and Moreland 1999). This leads to better motivation and 
utilization of tacit knowledge, resulting in increased benefits of team familiarity on productivity. 
Considering these, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 4: Team familiarity and task complexity interact positively in their effect on team 
productivity, such that the positive effect of team familiarity on team productivity is stronger 
when the nature of the focal task is more complex. 
 
3. Setting, Data and Variables 
We test our hypotheses using a dataset of all cardiac surgery operations in a hospital over seven years. 
Our setting is the cardiac unit of a 300-bed private hospital in Europe, which is property of an American 
non-profit organization. The hospital serves more than 2,000 patients per year and hosts around 70 
cardiac surgeries per month. Our data set consists of archival data of all cardiac surgeries during the 
period from 01/01/2004 to 03/31/2011 and includes 6,206 operations. For each surgery, the dataset 
includes, among others, information about the duration of the surgery, specific surgery type, members 
of the surgical team and patient characteristics.  
10 
 
 
 
Each surgery team has three to eight members including the Lead Surgeon, zero to four Assistant 
Surgeons, the Anesthesiologist, the Perfusionist (a technician who runs the heart-lung machine) and 
zero to three Scrub Nurses. Our dataset consists of 115 individuals in total: 44 surgeons who appear as 
Lead or Assistant Surgeon, 12 anesthesiologists, 10 perfusionists, and 49 nurses. 51 of these individuals 
(19 surgeons, 9 anesthesiologists, 3 perfusionists and 20 nurses) started working after the beginning of 
our dataset. 37 of the 115 individuals (13 surgeons, 6 anesthesiologists, 4 perfusionists and 14 nurses) 
do not appear during the last year of our dataset. We also have data regarding in-hospital mortality and 
information related to the patient’s condition prior to operation. Specifically, all patients are divided 
into three groups by the hospital according to the severity of their case and their characteristics after an 
initial clinical assessment. These groups are: “Severe”, “Medium” and “Mild”.  
After removing operations for which there are missing data, we are left with 6,171 operations. 
We also dropped operations during which the patient died since the duration of these operations can be 
misleading with regards to team productivity. As a result, we are left with 6,129 operations. Using the 
hospital’s classification system, and conducting interviews with several surgeons, we categorize each 
surgery into one of the following nine major sets: Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG), Valve 
Repair/Replacement, Congenital Surgery, Heart Failure, Tumor Removal, Routine Cardiac Surgery, 
Other Normal Surgery (where we include operations that are not characterized by any of the previous 
categories), Double Surgery (including two types of the previous categories during the same operation) 
and Triple Surgery (including three previous categories during the same operation). Our dataset consists 
of 3,273 CABG operations, 1,324 Valve Repair/Replacements, 86 Congenital Surgeries, 70 Heart 
Failure procedures, 20 Tumor Removals, 185 Routine Cardiac Surgeries, 78 Other Normal Surgeries, 
965 Double Surgeries and 128 Triple Surgeries. It is worth noting that all operations that belong to the 
last two categories (Double and Triple Surgeries) are characterized as “severe” cases.       
Finally, we conduct a limited number of interviews with several staff members to get a better 
understanding of the cardiac surgery procedures, and to acquire information related to management 
practice and organizational policies of the hospital.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable. We use surgery duration in minutes as our dependent variable. Consistent 
with prior research (Pisano et al. 2001, Edmondson et al. 2003, Reagans et al. 2005) we contend that 
shorter surgery durations represent an increase in the productivity of the surgical team. The duration is 
calculated by the time the patient enters the operating room until the time he/she is taken out of the 
operating room. The duration of the procedure is considered to be one of the most important factors 
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affecting the total costs for treating patients undergoing a cardiac surgery (Pisano et al. 2001). In our 
dataset, the average duration of an operation is equal to 294 minutes, with a minimum of 29 minutes 
and a maximum of 900 minutes.  
Independent Variables 
Team Familiarity Dispersion. In order to capture team familiarity dispersion, we first calculate 
the number of past collaborations for all pairs within the team. This represents pairwise familiarity for 
each pair in a team. We then calculate the standard deviation of these pairwise familiarity scores. This 
way, we characterize familiarity dispersion within the team, and we distinguish between teams which 
may have similar levels of average team familiarity, but with a difference in the distribution of past 
collaborations among the pairs in a team.  
Notice that dispersion can be operationalized in several ways depending on the theoretical 
construct. Indeed, Harrison and Klein (2007) provide a related discussion of three major types of 
diversity constructs (i.e., ‘separation’, ‘variety’ and ‘disparity’) and their appropriate 
operationalizations. Our conceptualization of familiarity dispersion within fluid teams where pairs 
differ one another in their position along a continuous attribute (e.g., team familiarity) is very similar 
to a ‘separation’ type construct which is typically operationalized by standard deviation. Notice that we 
have also considered alternative measures (e.g., coefficient of variation, range) for team familiarity 
dispersion in the robustness checks section.  
Bottleneck-Pair. For each team performing a surgery, we first identify the pair with the 
minimum number of past collaborations (i.e., the least familiar pair), and get its pairwise familiarity 
score. We divide this score with the team’s average familiarity score, and call the resulting number the 
‘bottleneck score’ of the team. That is, the ‘bottleneck score’ captures the degree of familiarity of the 
least familiar pair relative to the team’s average. We then use four bins to create a discrete variable 
representing bottleneck scores. Specifically, we create a new variable which is equal to 4 if the bottleneck 
score is lower than the 25th percentile, 3 if it is between the 25th percentile and the median, 2 if it is 
between the median and the 75th percentile and 1 if it is higher than the 75th percentile. This approach 
helps us identify teams who are more susceptible to bottleneck effects (i.e., those with very low 
bottleneck scores -lower than the 25th percentile) with compare to teams who are less susceptible to such 
bottleneck effects (i.e., those with bottleneck scores in other bins).  
Another way of capturing this effect could have been to take the pair with the lowest familiarity 
score and use their pairwise familiarity score directly, without dividing by the average team familiarity. 
Notice that similar to a factory setting, we expect pairs with the lowest familiarity scores to act as 
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bottlenecks relative to other pairs in the same team. That is, we argue that existing levels of information 
sharing and collaboration within a team will be hampered by a pair whose familiarity is much lower 
than the team’s average. Hence, taking the pair with the lowest familiarity in every team and using their 
familiarity score directly would not have been appropriate, because a low score may merely indicate a 
newly formed team with many unfamiliar pairs rather than an actual bottleneck.    
One could have also used bottleneck scores (lowest score divided by the team average) directly 
as a continuous variable. Notice that, instead of doing so, we assign each bottleneck score to one of the 
four bins described above. This is for two reasons. First, bottleneck scores have a highly skewed 
distribution (see Figure S1) whereby even transforming the variable (e.g., log transformation) does not 
alleviate the skewness problem. Second, our conceptual model suggests that the existence of a 
bottleneck pair in a team would hinder overall knowledge transfer capability of a team. Specifically, it 
suggests that certain teams are more susceptible to bottleneck effects than others. For example, consider 
two teams with very high bottleneck scores (i.e., their least familiar pairs do have a good level of 
familiarity compared to team’s average). Then, even if these two teams differ in their actual bottleneck 
scores, we expect neither of them to demonstrate any bottleneck related hindrance, that is, we do not 
expect to see any difference in their productivity as a result of the small difference in their actual 
bottleneck scores.  
Finally, notice that we have also considered alternative measures of this variable in the robustness 
checks section.  
Severe Familiarity Percentage. Recall that our third hypothesis asserts that the higher the ratio 
of familiarity gained from complex tasks, the higher the productivity. In order to measure the ratio of 
familiarity gained from complex tasks, we first need to identify complex tasks in our setting. As 
mentioned earlier, each procedure is characterized as “severe”, “medium” or “mild” according to the 
condition of the patient. In healthcare settings, variation in patient conditions is suggested to be the 
leading driver of ‘input’ uncertainty (Argote 1982, Gittel 2002). In addition, “severe” cases are 
associated with both higher output uncertainty as well as higher likelihood of adverse events. Combined 
together, we contend that ‘severe’ operations constitute more complex tasks due to higher uncertainty 
associated with them (Schroder et al. 1967, Campbell 1988). 
After identifying “severe” operations as complex tasks, we then break down team familiarity into 
two components depending on the way it is gained: Familiarity gained while performing a complex 
(i.e., “severe”) task, and familiarity gained while performing either a “medium” or a “mild” task. Our 
independent variable Severe Familiarity Percentage, then captures the ratio of team familiarity that is 
gained through working together in complex (i.e., severe) cases.  
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We compute this variable by first calculating the sum of all pairwise familiarity scores in the 
team considering shared experience in all three (mild, medium, severe) types of cases. We then calculate 
the same sum, but this time by only considering the severe cases. We divide the latter with the former 
to get Severe Familiarity Percentage. This way, we capture the percentage of past collaborations that 
took place during a complex operation and expect it to have a beneficial effect on team productivity.   
Control Variables 
Average Team Familiarity. Similar to previous works (Reagans et al. 2005), we count the 
number of times every pair in the team has worked together before (without including the current 
operation), take the sum for all pairs in the team and then divide this number by (N(N-1)/2), where N 
is the team size. This variable represents the average level of familiarity within the team. Similar to 
previous empirical studies (Reagans et al. 2005, Huckman et al. 2009, Huckman and Staats 2011, Staats 
2012) we expect team familiarity to promote team productivity. 
Team Size. We control for the number of all team members N. Larger teams may have difficulty 
in coordination, which could result in decreased productivity (Hackman 2002, Reagans et al. 2005). 
Individual Average Direct Experience. We control for individuals’ prior experience in the same 
type of procedures. For each team member, we calculate the number of times they appear in a same 
type procedure prior to the current procedure (not including the current one). We then take the sum, and 
divide by the number of team members. This way, we control for individual experience of team 
members in a same type of operation. Instead of considering individuals’ direct experience only in the 
same type of operations in the past, we could have also considered their experience on other types of 
operations (i.e., indirect experience), and combine them in a variable called Individual Average 
Experience which captures the total number of operations participated by each team member prior to 
the focal one. Our results remained the same when our present variable is replaced with this one. In 
addition, we control separately for Lead Surgeon’s experience and the other team members (since one 
can claim that Lead Surgeon’s experience is more important than the one of the other team members) 
and the results remain the same.  
Indicator of Quarter. In order to capture any effects of potential technological advances that 
may influence operation times, or potential changes in the hospital policy that may have an impact on 
operation durations (e.g., additional paperwork required, etc.), we include an indicator variable for each 
quarter of our sample indicating the quarter since the beginning of our dataset. 
Indicator for Patient Condition. In order to control for the patient’s condition which is 
characterized as “mild”, “medium”, or “severe”, we include two dummy variables in all models. 
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Considering “medium” as the reference category, “severe” variable is equal to one if the case is 
characterized as severe and zero otherwise, whereas “mild” variable is equal to one if the case is 
characterized as mild and zero otherwise. Because doctors already take into account a good number of 
critical factors such as age, clinical history, past complications, other existing health problems, etc. 
when they classify patients into these three categories prior to the operation, we believe it is a good 
indicator of overall patient characteristic. 
Indicator for Procedure Type. As described above, each operation can be characterized and 
considered in one of the nine categories. Hence, in our model we include eight indicators (we consider 
the most common type CABG as the reference category) that are equal to one if the procedure is in the 
respective category and zero otherwise.  
Indicator for the Lead Surgeon. In order to control for the skill of the Lead Surgeon, which 
may be one of the most influential factors in surgery performance, we control for the Lead Surgeon 
fixed effects by including a dummy variable indicating the Lead Surgeon in each operation. 
Indicator for the Day of the Week. Day of the week may influence productivity. So we include 
a dummy variable indicating the day of the week that each operation was performed. 
4. Results 
Given the structure of our data and the level of our analysis, to test our hypotheses, we use Ordinary 
Least Square Regression with AR(1) covariance structure to control for serial correlation among 
operations performed close in time (see Reagans et al. 2005 for similar structure). We also checked for 
normality of residuals and for heteroscedasticity. Also, consistent with the previous research which 
introduced team familiarity using a learning curve model (Reagans et al. 2005) and the learning 
literature (Pisano et al. 2001, Edmondson et al. 2003), we similarly take the logarithm of our dependent 
variable (i.e., surgery duration) and our learning related continuous variables. These variables also 
demonstrate positive right skewed distributions. However, for other continuous variables which are not 
learning related (i.e., team familiarity dispersion and team size), we keep their original forms. All of 
our transformations were also consistent with Tukey’s (1977) ladder of powers which reveals the most 
suitable transformations. Our model is the following: 
ln(surgery durationt) = β0 + β1 (team familiarity dispersiont) +  
                                       β2 (bottleneck-pairt) + 
                                       β3 ln(severe familiarity percentaget) +  
                                       β4 (severet) x ln(average familiarityt) +  
                                       β5 controls + ut ,  
                                       where  ut = ρut-1 + et 
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Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables. It reports the values for 
the logged and normalized variables as described earlier. Table 2 shows the results for hypotheses 1, 2, 
3 and 4. Notice that we report robust standard errors in all our models. Also, while our final sample 
includes 6,129 operations, notice that the number of observations in Table 2 is equal to 6,128 due to the 
AR(1) covariance structure. In order to check for any potential multicollinearity issues, we introduce 
our variables of interest one at a time in our models. In addition, we checked the Condition Index (CI) 
and it is below the suggested threshold of 30 (Cohen 2003). In model 1, we include only the control 
variables. In model 2, we include Team Familiarity Dispersion and we observe a 0.84% increase 
(significant at 1% level) in the adjusted R2. Team Familiarity Dispersion has a positive and significant 
coefficient at 1% level, providing support for our first hypothesis. In model 3 we remove Team 
Familiarity Dispersion and include Bottleneck-Pair. We observe a 0.84% increase (significant at 1% 
level) in the adjusted R2 compared to model 1. The coefficient of the Bottleneck-Pair is significant at 
1% level and positive providing support for H2. In model 4 we include both Team Familiarity 
Dispersion and Bottleneck-Pair and still find support for both H1 and H2. We observe a 1.49% increase 
(significant at 1% level) in the adjusted R2 compared to model 1. In model 5 we add Severe Familiarity 
Percentage and we observe a 0.41% increase (significant at 1% level) in the adjusted R2 compared to 
model 4. Severe Familiarity Percentage is significant at 1% level with a negative coefficient. That is, 
Hypothesis 3 is also supported.  
While the increase in the adjusted R2 between the initial model (with only control variables) and 
the full model may be small (i.e., 1.89%), this is not surprising. This is because of the dominance of 
clinical factors in explaining variation in most healthcare performance metrics (see for example 
Reagans et al. (2005), which report similarly small changes in the adjusted R2). 
An increase of one standard deviation on Team Familiarity Dispersion will increase the duration 
of the operation by 2.14% (assuming all other variables remain constant). In addition, the coefficient of 
our variable Bottleneck-Pair is equal to 0.0176, which suggests that moving from one category to 
another increases the duration of an operation by 1.76% (assuming all other variables remain constant). 
Furthermore, an increase of one standard deviation on Severe Familiarity Percentage will decrease 
duration by 16.84% (assuming all other variables remain constant).  
In order to test our fourth hypothesis, we include an interaction term, which is equal to the product 
of the dummy variable Severe and the continuous control variable Average Team Familiarity. Model 6 
of Table 2 presents the results for our fourth hypothesis. We observe that the results for our previous 
hypotheses remain the same and the adjusted R2 is increased by 0.21% (significant at 5% level). The 
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interaction term is significant at 1% level and negative, providing support for H4. Finally, we conduct 
a post hoc plot for Hypothesis 4 in order to examine the moderating effects as described by Aiken and 
West (1991) and Dawson and Richter (2006). Figure 1 reveals the moderating relationship as suggested 
in Hypothesis 4. 
5. Robustness Checks   
We perform a number of robustness checks to analyze the sensitivity of our results, to address 
endogeneity concerns and to rule out potential alternative explanations. We group these robustness 
checks into four sections as listed below:  
Potential Biases related to Data 
While we observe team familiarity over a long time period (i.e. seven years) and in large number of 
operations, we do not have information about team assignments prior to our dataset, that is, there is 
some unobserved familiarity before the start of our dataset. Like Reagans et al. (2005) which use a very 
similar data structure to calculate team experience, we expect our results to have no systematic bias. 
Nevertheless, we investigate potential effects of missing team familiarity by repeating our analysis after 
excluding different time intervals from the beginning of our dataset. That is, we re-run our analyses in 
subsamples by removing the first 12 months and 24 months respectively from our overall dataset of 87 
months. In each subsample, the observations include only surgeries in that subsample and we also 
calculate team familiarity by using that subsample (e.g., in the removal of 24 months case, our 
observations include only those surgeries between month 24 and month 87 and when calculating team 
familiarity we also use surgeries between month 24 and month 87). This way, we investigate the 
robustness of our results when there is missing data at the beginning. Our results are the same in terms 
of significance (with different magnitudes as expected) both in the full sample and in the subsample 
(where there is simulated missing experience), providing further support for our hypotheses.  
We also check the sensitivity of our results by repeating our analysis differently. In this case we 
remove the first 12 and 24 months, and while the observations include only surgeries in the remaining 
subsample, we calculate team familiarity by using the whole dataset. (e.g., when removing the first 24 
months, our observations include only those surgeries between month 24 and 87, but when calculating 
team familiarity we use all previous surgeries from month 0). Again our results are the same in terms 
of significance with slightly different coefficients.  
Potential Biases related to Methods and Variables Choice 
While our log transformation of the dependent variable is consistent with the literature, this is equivalent 
to a duration or survival model with a lognormal distributional assumption (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 
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Cleves et al. 2010). This may put a strong functional form assumption on the shape of the hazard 
function which may influence our results. Therefore, in order to check that our results are not sensitive 
to linear or log specification of our dependent variable, we have re-run all our analyses using linear 
form of the dependent variable. All of our results remained the same in terms of significance with 
different magnitudes in this specification.  
A potential issue with our use of AR (1) covariance structure is that our sample does not satisfy 
the equal-spacing assumption. We believe this does not pose a threat to our results because we have a 
large sample (i.e., 6,206 observations) representing a long time interval (i.e., 87 months). Nonetheless, 
we repeated our analysis after controlling for the unequal spacing in our dataset. Specifically, for each 
operation we calculate the time difference between subsequent operations in hours, and include this 
new variable in our analysis. Our results remained the same for all of our hypotheses.  
We also consider alternative measures of our main independent variables. First, instead of using 
standard deviation to capture team familiarity dispersion, we consider coefficient of variation (i.e., 
standard deviation/mean) and range (i.e., max-min) of pairwise familiarity scores in our teams. Our 
results with these alternative measures remained the same. Second, we consider an alternative 
construction of our bottleneck-pair variable. Specifically, after calculating the bottleneck score as before 
(i.e., familiarity of the least familiar pair divided by the average familiarity of the team), we create four 
bins depending on the bottleneck score: (1) if the bottleneck score is lower than the 25th percentile, (2) 
if it is between the 25th percentile and the median, (3) if it is between the median and the 75th percentile, 
and (4) if it is higher than the 75th percentile. We then used three indicator variables for these categories 
taking the last category as the reference and re-run our models. Indicator for the first category (i.e., 1) 
is significant at 1% with a positive coefficient, indicator for the second category (i.e., 2) is significant 
at 5% and positive with a lower coefficient than the first category (a t-test also indicated that the two 
coefficients are different), and the indicator for the third category (i.e., 3) is insignificant. This confirms 
our earlier results for the second hypothesis. In addition, we use an alternative continuous variable for 
Bottleneck-Pair, which is equal to the absolute distance between the least familiar pair and the team’s 
average familiarity. Consistent with our previous results for H2, this variable is significant and positive 
(p<0.01). Finally, we also use alternative variables for both dispersion and bottleneck-pair in the same 
model (coefficient of variation and absolute distance between the least familiar pair and team’s average 
familiarity, and range and absolute distance between the least familiar pair and team’s average 
familiarity) and get the same qualitative results for all of our hypotheses. 
Our analyses indicate that while every team has a least familiar pair, bottleneck influence come 
into effect at a certain point, after which it becomes a performance hampering constraint for the entire 
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team. Similar to Berry Jaeker and Tucker (2016) which identifies an inflection point in utilization and 
performance relationship in healthcare, we next try to identify the threshold for bottleneck effects. To 
do so, we create ten indicator variables corresponding to each decile of the bottleneck scores, using the 
top decile (above 90%) as the reference. All indicators up to the 5th decile are significant at either 1% 
or 5% level and positive, whereas the 5th decile indicator is significant at 10%, and the remaining 
indicators for higher deciles are insignificant. This suggests that the threshold lies between the 5th and 
the 6th decile of the bottleneck score at which point productivity hindrance of bottleneck effects come 
into effect.   
Potential Selection Biases  
Selection of team members in surgery operations could be a significant concern. Although according to 
the hospital management the assignment of surgeons to operations is random, one may argue that Lead 
Surgeons may prefer working with specific Assistants Surgeons, and this may bias our results related 
to Hypothesis 1. In order to address this, we repeated our analysis by calculating team familiarity 
dispersion without taking into account any pairs that include only surgeons (i.e., surgeon-surgeon pair) 
in a team. Our results with the modified team familiarity dispersion remained the same in terms of 
significance with slightly smaller effect sizes. In addition, nurses, anaesthesiologists and perfusionists 
are randomly assigned to operations according to their shifts. Nonetheless, in order to eliminate any 
potential bias in our results, we examined this issue further: We calculated for each Lead Surgeon the 
percentages of the operations that she has worked with each anaesthesiologist, perfusionist and first 
scrub nurse (i.e. lead nurse). With anaesthesiologists, the highest percentage is 33.10% (but the Lead 
Surgeon has worked with 9 out of the 12 anaesthesiologists in our dataset), with perfusionists the highest 
percentage is equal to 36.19% (and the Lead Surgeon has worked with 6 out of the 10 perfusionists 
appearing in our dataset) and with lead nurses it is equal to 29.81% (the lead surgeon has worked with 
38 out of the 41 nurses appearing as lead nurses in our sample). Considering these percentages and the 
fact that out of the 115 individuals in our sample, 51 of them (19 surgeons, 9 anesthesiologists, 3 
perfusionists and 20 nurses) started working after the beginning of our dataset and 37 (13 surgeons, 6 
anesthesiologists, 4 perfusionists and 14 nurses) do not appear during the last year of our dataset, we 
believe that there is no systematic selection of lead nurses, anesthesiologists, or perfusionists by the 
Lead Surgeon in the hospital.    
One may also argue that some surgeons could avoid operations with high chance of 
complications, more severe cases might be assigned to more experienced Lead Surgeons, or easier cases 
might be assigned to junior Lead Surgeons. First, according to our interviews, official hospital policy 
19 
 
 
 
is clear in not allowing surgeons to choose or avoid certain operations. Second, we investigate the spread 
of “severe”, “moderate” and “mild” operations among surgeons with a chi-square test of independence 
where the null hypothesis is that each patient’s assigned doctor is independent of her condition. We do 
not reject the null hypothesis (with chi-square statistics of 13.271, 16.887 and 14.674 for each operation 
type respectively), and conclude that surgeries are indeed evenly spread among lead surgeons. Third, 
in our analysis we have excluded all highly complex cases that resulted in the death of the patient during 
surgery (42 in total). We repeat our analysis after including them and get the same results in terms of 
significance. Finally, we repeat our analysis after excluding the severe and all the mild cases in our 
sample, and left with only the medium cases. Our conclusions remained the same for all of our 
hypotheses. 
Finally, if lead surgeons prefer to work with more familiar people for severe cases (since there is 
an increased likelihood of major adverse events), this may create bias in our results for H4. In order to 
rule out this alternative explanation, we examined an alternative specification of task complexity. We 
created a new variable called Patient, which reflects the condition of the patient before the operation. 
Recall that severe cases represent the most complex operations. In the new specification, Patient is 
equal to 1 if the condition of the patient characterized by the hospital is “mild”; 2 if it is “medium”; and 
3 if it is “severe”. Next, we created a new interaction term by multiplying Average Team Familiarity 
and Patient and we ran our analysis for H4 using the new variables. Our results for hypotheses 1, 2 and 
3 are the same in terms of significance and very similar in terms of coefficients, and the new interaction 
term is also significant and negative at 5% level providing support for the fourth hypothesis. We 
therefore believe that our results for H4 are not biased by potential selection of more familiar members 
by the lead surgeons in severe cases. This is because we observe an increasing beneficial effect of team 
familiarity on productivity with increasing task complexity (i.e., from mild-1 to severe-3).  
Other Alternative Explanations 
An alternative explanation for H1 and H2 could be that the detrimental effects from familiarity 
dispersion and bottleneck-pair may actually be created not by the mechanisms we suggested, but rather 
by the sole presence of a new team member or a new pair (i.e., new to other team members), or by a 
team member with very little prior individual experience (i.e., new to the hospital). In order to address 
this, we conducted two analyses. First, we ran our analysis after removing 780 operations from our 
sample in which there is a new member, or a pair working together for the first time. Second, we 
repeated our analysis after introducing a new variable which is equal to the direct experience of the 
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team member with the lowest direct experience in the team. Our conclusions remained the same in both 
analyses.  
An alternative explanation for H3 could be that it is not familiarity, but individual experience 
gained in highly complex operations that may make the team more productive subsequently. In order 
to test this, we repeated our analysis by replacing our variable Individual Average Direct Experience 
with a new variable Individual Average Severe Experience, which controls for individual experience of 
team members from severe operations in the past. Introducing this new variable did not change our 
conclusions for H3. Moreover, we repeat our analysis after controlling for the Lead Surgeon Direct 
Experience (while including the same variables for other team members) and find consistent results 
with our earlier findings. 
6. Policy Implications of Familiarity Dispersion and Bottleneck Pair 
We believe the new refinements of team familiarity proposed in this paper are not only statistically 
significant but also managerially relevant, as our results suggest new and potentially different 
managerial actions than those previously suggested in the literature. For example, finding a positive 
effect of average team familiarity on performance, Huckman et al. (2009) and Huckman and Staats 
(2011) discussed “the managerial advice to keep teams together” (p.325) to increase the average 
familiarity of the teams. However, they also acknowledged the practical difficulty of such strategy as 
“all team members cannot work on teams with high team familiarity” (p.325). In our study, our key 
findings highlight the negative effects of team familiarity dispersion and bottleneck pairs on 
productivity. Therefore, rather than trying to keep team members together by allocating the same team 
members to the same teams repeatedly, we suggest managers to actively focus on the least familiar pairs 
and individuals, and try to increase their familiarity levels.  
In order to further assess the practical implications of our proposals, we next run a basic policy 
simulation with team assignment rules based on our results. Specifically, we compare productivity 
implications of two policies: Based on our findings, Policy_dispersion is concerned with the detrimental 
effects of dispersion and bottlenecks, and aims to increase the familiarity levels of the least familiar 
pairs in the hospital. Policy_stable, on the other hand is based on previous findings in the team 
familiarity literature which highlight the beneficial effects of average team familiarity on productivity. 
That is, the objective of Policy_dispersion is to reduce dispersion and bottleneck effects whereas the 
objective of Policy_stable is to increase average team familiarity by keeping teams as stable as possible. 
We then compare the estimated productivity benefits of these two policies.  
We use real data from our study and run our simulations in three different time intervals, each 
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with duration of three months, so that we can observe diverse set of familiarity scores. The simulations 
take place between the 21st - 24th, 43rd - 47th, and 65th – 68th months in our sample. These time intervals 
represent the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile of our longitudinal sample. Also, during 
these three month time intervals, there were 1, 2 and 1 new hires respectively. Considering that 51 
individuals joined the hospital during our entire sample period of 87 months (i.e., 0.586 new hires per 
month on average), these intervals are indeed representative of our sample in terms of employee hires. 
In each of these quarters, we use existing pairwise familiarity levels (i.e., those from the beginning of 
our dataset to the focal month), and form a new team for each upcoming operation based on the proposed 
policy. We then calculate predicted productivity improvements (i.e., reduction in duration) from the 
proposed team assignment rules based on our econometric model by focusing on average team 
familiarity, dispersion, and bottleneck pair, and by keeping all other variables constant.  
Policy_dispersion: First, we calculate the familiarity score of each individual with all other individuals 
in our sample using the data from the beginning of our sample to the current operation. Next, following 
our hospital’s existing practice, we assign Lead Surgeons to individual operations with a rotating 
schedule. After assigning Lead Surgeons, we then assign the remaining team members based on their 
familiarity levels with each other. Specifically, in line with this policy, we assign individuals with the 
lowest pairwise familiarity scores to the focal operation. In making such assignments, we also impose 
multiple constraints to reflect realities of our setting as much as possible. These include taking into 
account the required roles needed in surgery teams and also making sure that no individual conducts 
more than two operations per day. Overall, the objective of this policy is to reduce familiarity dispersion 
and bottleneck effects by actively assigning the least familiar individuals to the same teams.    
Policy_stable: For this policy, similar to the previous policy, we first calculate the familiarity score of 
each individual with all other individuals and assign Lead Surgeons to operations on a rotating basis. 
Next, after identifying the Lead Surgeon for the focal operation, we calculate his/her existing familiarity 
scores with all individuals (using the entire sample up to the focal operation), and then assign those 
individuals to whom the Lead Surgeon has the highest familiarity scores to the same team to perform 
the focal operation. We then keep these team members together with the Lead Surgeon for the rest of 
the simulation period. This allows us to create highly stable teams around Lead Surgeons with high 
average team familiarity scores. In addition, when a newly hired individual appears, we replace him/her 
with the member who has the lowest familiarity score in our sample. Similar to the previous policy, we 
also impose multiple constraints such as considering the particular role of individuals with replacement 
decisions (e.g., a nurse to nurse replacement), and not allowing individuals to conduct more than two 
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operations per day. Overall, this policy aims to promote average team familiarity by keeping teams as 
stable as possible. 
 We next compare the two policies with each other and with the existing team assignment practice 
as observed in our sample.  
Comparison of the policies: As expected, both policies result in lower operations durations with 
compare to the current case. However, notice that in all simulations, Policy_dispersion performs better 
than Policy_stable with a higher reduction in overall expected duration. Table 3 demonstrates the 
changes in team familiarity dispersion, average team familiarity, bottleneck pair and the expected 
duration in the two policies with compare to the current practice. For dispersion and average familiarity, 
we show the percentage change with respect to the current policy. For bottleneck-pair, we show the 
actual difference between the proposed policy and the current policy as this is an ordinal discrete 
variable ranging from 1 to 4 (a score of 1 in the Table indicates a one unit change, e.g., from 2 to 3). 
We also indicate in parenthesis the percent change in the bottleneck score, from which bottleneck-pair 
is calculated.  
With Policy_dispersion, expected duration is reduced by 3.63% translating into a reduction of 10.42 
minutes over three months on average. This reduction is due to a decrease in dispersion and in 
bottleneck pair. Despite the fact that average team familiarity also decreases, which leads to an increase 
in duration in this policy, the expected gains from dispersion and bottleneck-pair are higher than the 
detrimental effects of reduced average team familiarity. On the other hand, by employing Policy_stable, 
expected duration is decreased by 0.47% which is translated into 1.35 minutes on average. Although 
dispersion and bottleneck pair increase as a result of this policy (which would have increased duration), 
the gains from average team familiarity are higher than the losses associated with increased dispersion 
and bottleneck-pair, therefore resulting in overall slightly decreased duration. In addition to our original 
policy period of three months, we also checked the robustness of our comparisons by considering two-
month and four-month periods respectively. In all cases, consistent with our original analysis, 
Policy_dispersion results in higher productivity improvement than Policy_stable.  
While numerous other team assignment policies could be considered with similar objectives, our 
goal in these simulations is to capture the essentials of the proposed mechanisms in a simple and 
practical way. Also, because we want to demonstrate that Policy_dispersion may perform better than 
Policy_stable, in making team assignment policies, we incorporate favorable scenarios for 
Policy_stable (e.g., by replacing a newcomer with the least familiar individual) to make a conservative 
comparison between the two policies.  
23 
 
 
 
Previous work on team familiarity highlighted the beneficial effects of team familiarity on 
productivity and suggested managers to keep team members together as much as possible to maximize 
average team familiarity. While this seems like an obvious recommendation, our study points out to a 
detrimental role of dispersion and bottleneck pairs, two elements that are not considered in the previous 
literature. Indeed, we demonstrate that stable team recommendations based entirely on average team 
familiarity may be myopic. Our simple policy analyses reveal that a dispersion and bottleneck 
minimizing policy perform better than a team familiarity maximizing policy.  
Many fluid team settings are characterized by high employee turnover, and therefore new team 
members will inevitably need to adjust to those team members who are already familiar with each other. 
Noticing the potential detrimental effects of dispersion and bottlenecks created by these individuals, 
managers can mitigate this problem by adopting rotation-based schedules with a special emphasis on 
the least familiar pairs. Such practice will lead to long-term increased productivity. In addition, in such 
a policy, average team familiarity will also eventually increase in the long-run. In contrast, a policy 
aiming to keep the same teams together might create a short-term beneficial effect for team productivity, 
but will eventually lead to decreased performance in the long-run due to detrimental effects of 
dispersion and bottleneck-pairs.      
7. Conclusion and Discussion  
Although organizations increasingly rely on fluid teams to perform essential tasks, our understanding 
of formation and operations of fluid teams remain limited. In this study, we observe the relationship 
between composition dynamics of fluid teams and subsequent productivity implications over a long 
time period. Studying fluid teams at a granular level, we offer a new account of how shared work 
experience among team members influence team productivity.  
Most of the previous literature in operations and management has focused on mean levels of 
familiarity within teams (e.g., Edmondson 1999, Faraj and Sproull 2000, Huckman and Staats 2011) 
and has largely ignored the distribution of pairwise familiarity scores. This is a significant limitation 
for understating the role of team familiarity in fluid settings, because fluid teams have a dynamic nature 
in terms of team memberships, and there is likely significant variation in terms of pairwise familiarity 
within these teams even if they have similar average levels of team familiarity. Consequently, the 
present study improves our conceptual understanding of team familiarity by considering not only the 
mean, but also the shape of the familiarity distribution, and by demonstrating the importance of 
dispersion and bottlenecks in explaining team productivity. Considering the two levels of relationships 
in fluid team settings: at the pair and at the team level, while the emergence of average team familiarity 
is a straightforward extension of pairwise familiarity, dispersion and bottleneck capture distinct team 
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level characteristics. In addition, although these two are somewhat related, we contend that dispersion 
and bottleneck are two distinct theoretical concepts.  
An important observation we had is that a pair within the team with a familiarity level much less 
than the average familiarity of the team may slow down the whole team, function as a bottleneck, and 
cause delays and eventually decrease the productivity of the whole team. Our conceptualization of 
bottleneck-pair could also be viewed with the lens of recent research about the introduction of surgical 
checklists and their benefits (Haynes et al. 2009, Gawande 2010). A central feature of surgical checklists 
is preoperative team briefings where each person in the team speaks and introduces herself to other 
team members. Surgical checklists are suggested to be highly effective in improving teamwork and 
communication in the operating room (Gawande 2010), and team briefings have been associated with 
better surgical outcomes (Lingard et al. 2008). We suggest that, a key benefit of team briefings could 
be to reduce or eliminate the potentially negative effect of a bottleneck pair in team. While team 
briefings may not contribute much to team members who are already quite familiar with each other, it 
may provide substantial benefits in reducing potential communication and information sharing 
problems between team members with very little prior shared work experience (i.e., bottleneck pairs). 
Our results indicate that the existence of such a bottleneck pair can increase the duration of an average 
operation by 5.17 minutes. So eliminating such a bottleneck pair (moving a pair from the highest 
category to the next one) will result in about 6 hours savings in total surgery time per month. Also, 
when there is a new staff member, hence the effect is inevitable; managers can moderate the detrimental 
effect by initially assigning her and other relatively new employees to simple cases together.  
Another important finding which may help managers to develop better team composition 
strategies is that team members that have worked together previously in more complex tasks could 
develop a transactive memory system more effectively. They may also create stronger bonds and 
relationships when their shared experience comes from complex cases, which helps them better 
collaborate in subsequent tasks. When assigning individuals to teams, managers could consider not only 
the amount of shared work experience, but also the nature of shared experience in previous operations 
(e.g., complex vs non-complex tasks). One suggestion for hospital managers could be that if an 
occasional operation requires very high levels of efficiency (e.g., a patient in critical condition), then 
for this operation, assigning individuals who worked together in many complex tasks in the past could 
be a preferable strategy to enhance their productivity.  
Finally, teams with high levels of team familiarity seem to be ideal for performing more complex 
tasks because the benefits from being familiar with each other increase as the level of task complexity 
increases. That is, when the hospital faces a highly complex case, it may be a preferable strategy to 
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assign individuals who are highly familiar with each other to these cases, as the benefit of team 
familiarity will be maximized during this complex operation.   
As in all empirical studies, our results come with limitations. First, our data comes from a single 
hospital, so one has to be cautious when interpreting our results. While cardiac surgery operations are 
an appealing setting with a mix of repetitive and highly critical knowledge-based tasks to study fluid 
teams, generalizing our results to other fluid team settings requires a careful approach. Moreover, our 
dataset includes limited information regarding patients’ condition before the operation, as well as 
doctors’ characteristics. One would ideally like to have more detailed information about patients’ 
condition and characteristics such as Higgins Score or EuroScore, but unfortunately this was not 
available from our data source. Similarly, more detailed information on doctors’ experience, 
performance, skill sets, and other characteristics would have been useful to control in predicting team 
productivity. In addition, in this study we focus on productivity implications of team familiarity with 
the help of our highly granular surgery duration data (in minutes), and used in-hospital mortality (a 
crude measure of quality) as a robustness check to make sure productivity improvements do not come 
at the expense of increased mortality rates. Future research can investigate how team familiarity can 
simultaneously affect both productivity and quality in healthcare settings by obtaining more granular 
quality data such as hospital revisits, clinical and patient reported improvements, among others. Finally, 
our study joins to the stream of work which highlights the importance of team familiarity in fluid teams 
with a large scale empirical study. As fluid teams become more of a rule than exception in many 
organizational settings, future research could provide a more in-depth and vivid account of how team 
familiarity influences team operations and task dynamics with observational or experimental studies.  
Despite these limitations our results provide important insights into operations management 
research and practice. Our study suggests that managers could practice better team composition 
strategies that may allow them to make optimal use of past shared experience of team members, and 
thus improve productivity of fluid team operations without making use of any additional resources. In 
addition, in a critical and costly setting like healthcare, any productivity gain (e.g., reduction in 
operation time) will not only reduce total costs of treating patients, but it may also translate into better 
clinical outcomes for patients by reducing infection risks or adverse event probabilities. Also, answering 
the call to decompose team familiarity and further investigate its detailed effects on performance 
(Huckman et al. 2009), our study introduces two new concepts: team familiarity dispersion and 
bottleneck pairs. Further disentangling team familiarity by concentrating on how much of the shared 
work experience is gained during complex tasks in the past; we demonstrate that not all experiences are 
equivalent, and the higher the ratio of familiarity which is gained from complex tasks, the higher the 
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productivity of the team. Finally, we identify focal task complexity as an important moderator between 
average team familiarity and productivity, and find that team familiarity is particularly helpful when 
performing more complex tasks.  
 
References 
Aiken, L. S., S. G. West. 1991. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Altuntas, S., U. Baykal. 2010. Relationship between nurses’ organizational trust levels and their 
organizational citizenship behaviors. J. of Nursing Scholarship. 42(2) 186-194. 
Argote, L. 1982. Input uncertainty and organizational coordination in hospital emergency units. Admin. 
Sci. Quart. 27(3) 420-434. 
Banker, R. D., J. M. Field, K. K. Sinha. 2001. Work-team implementation and trajectories of 
manufacturing quality: A longitudinal field study. Manufacturing & Service Oper. Management. 
3(1): 25-42.  
Berman, S. L., J. Down, C. W. L. Hill. 2002. Tacit knowledge as a source of competitive advantage in 
the National Basketball Association. Acad. of Management J. 45(1) 13-31. 
Berry Jaeker, J. A., A. Tucker. 2016. Past the point of speeding up: The negative effects of workload 
saturation on efficiency and patient severity. Management Sci. Published online in Articles in 
Advance 04 Apr 2016: 1-21. 
 BR. Staats, D.M. Upton. 2009. Team familiarity, role experience, and performance: Evidence from 
Indian software services. Management Sci. 55(1) 85-100. 
Bezrukova, K., S. M. B. Thatcher, K. A. Jehn. 2007. Group heterogeneity and faultlines: Comparing 
alignment and dispersion theories of group composition. Conflict in organizational groups: New 
directions in theory and practice: 57-92. 
Bion, W. R. 1962. Experience in groups. Basic Books, NY.  
Boudreau, J, W. Hopp, J. O. McClain, L. J. Thomas. 2003. On the interface between operations and 
human resources management. Manufacturing & Service Oper. Management. 5(3): 179-202. 
Brandon, D. P., A. B. Hollingshead. 2004. Transactive memory systems in organizations: Matching 
tasks, expertise, and people. Organ. Sci.15(6) 633-644. 
Bushe, G. R., A. Chu. 2011. Fluid teams: Solutions to the problems of unstable team membership. 
Organ. Dynam. 40(3) 181-188. 
Campbell, D. J. 1988. Task complexity: A review and analysis. Acad. of Management Rev. 13(1) 40-
52. 
Catchpole, K. R., A. E. B. Giddings, M. Wilkinson, G. Hirst, T. Dale, M.R. De Leval. 2007. Improving 
patient safety by identifying latent failures in successful operations. Surgery. 142(1) 102-110. 
Chillemi, O., B. Gui. 1997. Team human capital and worker mobility. J. of Labor Econom. 15(4) 567-
585. 
Choi, J. N., T. Sy. 2010. Group-level organizational citizenship behavior: Effects of demographic 
faultlines and conflict in small work groups. J. of Organ. Behav. 31(7): 1032-1054. 
Cohen, S. G., D. E. Bailey. 1997. What makes teams work: Group effectiveness research from the shop 
floor to the executive suite. J. of Management. 23(3) 239-290. 
Cohen, J., P. Cohen, L. S. Aiken, S. G. West. 2003. Applied Multiple Regression—Correlation Analysis 
for the Behavioral Sciences, 3rd eds. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ. 
Cole, M. S., A. G. Bedeian, R. R. Hirschfeld, B. Vogel. 2011. Dispersion-Composition Models in 
Multilevel Research A Data-Analytic Framework. Organ. Res. Methods. 14(4): 718-734. 
Coleman, J. S. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. Amer. J. of Sociology. 94 95-120. 
Colquitt, J.A, J. A. Lepine, C. P. Zapata, R. E. Wild. 2011. Trust in typical and high-reliability contexts: 
Building and reacting to trust among firefighters. Academy of Management J. 54(5) 999-1015. 
Cook, L. M. 2013. Can nurses trust nurses in recovery reentering the workplace? Nursing 43(3) 21-24. 
Cramton, C. D. 2001. The mutual knowledge problem and its consequences for dispersed 
collaboration. Organ. Sci. 12(3) 346-371. 
27 
 
 
 
Cross, R., A. Parker, L. Prusak, S. P. Borgatti. 2001. Knowing what we know: Supporting knowledge 
creation and sharing in social networks. Organ. Dynam. 30(2) 100-120. 
Davenport, D. L., W. G. Henderson, C. L. Mosca, S. F. Khuri, R. M. Mentzer. 2007. Risk-adjusted 
morbidity in teaching hospitals correlates with reported levels of communication and collaboration 
on surgical teams but not with scale measures of teamwork climate, safety climate, or working 
conditions. J. of the Amer. College of Surgeons. 205(6) 778-784. 
Dawson, J. F., A. W. Richter. 2006. Probing three-way interactions in moderated multiple regression: 
development and application of a slope difference test. J. of Appl. Psych. 91(4) 917-926. 
De Jong, B. A., K. T. Dirks. 2012. Beyond shared perceptions of trust and monitoring in teams: 
implications of asymmetry and dissensus. J. of Appl. Psych. 97(2): 391. 
Dineen, B. R., R. A. Noe, J. D. Shaw, M. K. Duffy, C. Wiethoff. 2007. Level and dispersion of 
satisfaction in teams: Using foci and social context to explain the satisfaction-absenteeism 
relationship. Acad. of Management J. 50(3) 623-643. 
Drucker, P. F. 1999. Knowledge-worker productivity: The biggest challenge. California Management 
Rev. 41(2) 79-94. 
Edmondson, A. C. 1999. Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Admin. Sci. Quart. 
44(2) 350-383. 
Edmondson, A. C., R. M. Bohmer, G. P. Pisano. 2001. Disrupted routines: Team learning and new 
technology implementation in hospitals. Admin. Sci. Quart. 46(4) 685-716. 
Edmondson, A. C., I. M. Nembhard. 2009. Product Development and Learning in Project Teams: The 
Challenges Are the Benefits. J. of Product Innovation Management. 26(2) 123-138. 
Edmondson, A. C., A. B. Winslow, R. M. J. Bohmer, G. P. Pisano. 2003. Learning how and learning 
what: Effects of tacit and codified knowledge on performance improvement following technology 
adoption. Decision Sci. 34(2) 197-224. 
Espinosa, J. A., S. A. Slaughter, R. E. Kraut, J. D. Herbsleb. 2007. Familiarity, complexity, and team 
performance in geographically distributed software development. Organ. Sci. 18(4) 613-630. 
Evans, C. R., K. L. Dion. 1991. Group cohesion and performance a meta-analysis. Small Group Res. 
22(2) 175-186. 
Faraj, S., L. Sproull. 2000. Coordinating expertise in software development teams. Management Sci. 
46(12) 1554-1568. 
Feldman, D. C. 1984. The development and enforcement of group norms. Acad. of Management Rev. 
9(1) 47-53. 
Field, J. M., K. K. Sinha. 2005. Applying process knowledge for yield variation reduction: A 
longitudinal field study. Decision Sciences. 36(1) 159-186.  
Fleming, M., S. Smith, J. Slaunwhite, J. Sullivan. 2006. Investigating interpersonal competencies of 
cardiac surgery teams. Canadian J. of Surgery. 49(1) 22. 
Gardner, H. K., F. Gino, BR. Staats 2012. Dynamically integrating knowledge in teams: Transforming 
resources into performance. Acad. of Management J. 55(4) 998-1022. 
Gawande, A. 2010. Checklist Manifesto, Vol. 200. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
Gaynes, R. P., D. H. Culver, T. C. Horan, J. R. Edwards, C. Richards, J. S. Tolson, and the National 
Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System. 2001. Surgical site infections (SSI) rates in the United 
States, 1992-1998: The national nosocomial infections surveillance system basic SSI risk index. 
Clinical Infectious Diseases. 33(Suppl 2) 69-77. 
Gersick, C. J., J. R. Hackman. 1990. Habitual routines in task-performing groups. Organ. Behav. and 
Human Decision Processes. 47(1) 65-97. 
Gibbons, C., J. Bruce, J. Carpenter, A. P. Wilson, J. Wilson, A. Pearson, D. L. Lamping, Z. H. 
Krukowski, B. C. Reeves. 2011. Identifications of risk factors by systematic review and 
development of risk-adjusted models for surgical site infection. Health Technological 
Assessment.15(30) 1-156.  
Gittel, J. H. 2002. Coordinating mechanisms in care provider groups: Relational coordination as a 
mediator and input uncertainty as a moderator of performance effects. Management Sci. 48(11) 
1408-1426. 
Goldratt, E. M., J. Cox. 1984. The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement. North River Press, 
Croton-on-Hudson, NY. 
28 
 
 
 
Gruenfeld, D. H., E. A. Mannix, K. Y. Williams, M. A. Neale. 1996. Group composition and decision 
making: How member familiarity and information distribution affect process and performance. 
Organ. Behav. and Human Decision Processes 67(1) 1-15. 
Hackman, J. R. 1987. The design of work teams. J. W. Lorsch eds. Handbook of Organizational 
Behavior. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 315 342. 
Hackman, J. R. 2002. Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances. Harvard Business 
Press, Boston, MA. 
Harrison, D. A., K. J. Klein. 2007. What's the difference? Diversity constructs as separation, variety, or 
disparity in organizations. Acad. of Management Rev. 32(4) 1199-1228. 
Harrison, D. A., S. Mohammed, J. E. McGrath, A. T. Florey, S. W. Vanderstoep. 2003. Time matters 
in team performance: Effects of member familiarity, entrainment, and task discontinuity on speed 
and quality. Personnel Psych. 56(3) 633-669. 
Haynes, A.B., Weiser, T.G., Berry, W.R., Lipsitz, S.R., Breizat, A.H., Dellinger, E.P., et al. 2009 A 
surgical safety checklist to reduce morbidity and mortality in a global population. New England 
Journal of Medicine. 360(5):491–499. 
Hoffmann, D. A., Lei, Z., & Grant, A. M. 2009. Seeking help in the shadow of a doubt: The sensemaking 
processes underlying how nurses decide whom to ask for advice. J. of Appl. Psych. 94(5): 1261-
1274. 
Hollingshead, A. B. 2001. Cognitive interdependence and convergent expectations in transactive 
memory. J. of Personality and Soc. Psych. 81(6) 1080. 
Hornsey, M. J., M. A. Hogg. 2000. Assimilation and diversity: An integrative model of subgroup 
relations. Personality and Social Psych. Rev. 4(2) 143-156. 
Hopp, W. J., S. M. R. Iravani, F. Liu. 2009. Managing white‐collar work: An operations‐oriented 
survey. Production and Oper. Management. 18(1) 1-32. 
Hopp, W. J., M. L. Spearman. 2000. Factory Physics: Foundations of Manufacturing Management, 
2nd ed. McGraw-Hill, Burr Ridge, IL. 
Huckman, R. S., BR. Staats. 2011. Fluid tasks and fluid teams: The impact of diversity in experience 
and team familiarity on team performance. Manufacturing & Service Oper. Management. 13(3) 
310-328. 
Huckman, R. S., BR. Staats, D.M. Upton. 2009. Team familiarity, role experience, and performance: 
Evidence from Indian software services. Management Sci. 55(1) 85-100. 
Jackson, S. E., A. Joshi, N. L. Erhardt. 2003. Recent research on team and organizational diversity: 
SWOT analysis and implications. J. of Management. 29(6) 801-830. 
Kane, A. A., L. Argote, J. M. Levine. 2005. Knowledge transfer between groups via personnel rotation: 
Effects of social identity and knowledge quality. Organ. Behav. and Human Decision Processes 
96(1) 56-71. 
Katz, R. 1982. The effects of group longevity on project communication and performance. Admin. Sci. 
Quart. 27(1) 81-104. 
Klein, K. J., S. W. Kozlowski. 2000. Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations: 
Foundations, extensions, and new directions, Jossey-Bass. 
Levine, J. M., R. L. Moreland. 1999. Knowledge transmission in work groups: Helping newcomers to 
succeed. J. M. Levine, D. M. Messick, L. L. Thomson eds. Shared Cognition in Organizations: The 
Management of Knowledge, Psychology Press, New York, 267-296. 
Lewis, K. 2003. Measuring transactive memory systems in the field: Scale development and validation. 
J. Appl. Psych. 88(4) 587–604 
Liao, H., D. Liu, R. Loi. 2010. Looking at both sides of the social exchange coin: A social cognitive 
perspective on the joint effects of relationship quality and differentiation on creativity. Acad. of 
Management J. 53(5) 1090-1109. 
Lingard, L., G. Regehr, B. Orser, R. Reznick, G. R. Baker, D. Doran,S. Espin,J. Bohnen, S. Whyte. 
2008. Evaluation of a preoperative checklist and team briefing among surgeons, nurses, and 
anesthesiologists to reduce failures in communication. Arch. of Surgery. 143(1) 12. 
Makary, M. A., J B. Sexton, J. A. Freischlag, C. G. Holzmueller, E. A. Millman, L. Rowen, P. J 
Pronovost. 2006. Operating room teamwork among physicians and nurses: teamwork in the eye of 
the beholder. J. of the Amer. College of Surgeons. 202(5) 746-752. 
29 
 
 
 
Moreland, R. L. 1999. Transactive memory: Learning who knows what in work groups and 
organizations. L. Thomson, D. Messick, J. Levine, eds. Sharing Knowledge in Organization. 
Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Nembhard, I. M., A. C. Edmondson. 2006. Making it safe: The effects of leader inclusiveness and 
professional status on psychological safety and improvement efforts in health care teams. J. of 
Organ. Behav. 27(7) 941-966. 
Nemeth, C. J. 1986. Differential contributions of majority and minority influence. Psych. Rev. 93(1) 
23-32. 
Paletz, S. B. F., C. D. Schunn. 2011. Assessing group-level participation in fluid teams: Testing a new 
metric. Behav. Res. Methods. 43(2) 522-536. 
Pisano, G. P., R. M. J. Bohmer, A. C. Edmondson. 2001. Organizational differences in rates of learning: 
Evidence from the adoption of minimally invasive cardiac surgery. Management Sci. 47(6) 752-
768. 
Pullon S., Competence, respect and trust: Key features for successful interprofessional nurse-doctor 
relationships. 2008. J. of Interprofessional Care. 22(2) 133-147.  
Reagans, R., L. Argote, D. Brooks. 2005. Individual experience and experience working together: 
Predicting learning rates from knowing who knows what and knowing how to work together. 
Management Sci. 51(6) 869-881. 
Schroder, H., M. Driver, S. Streuferi. 1967. Human information processing. Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, New York. 
Siemsen, E., A.V. Roth, S. Balasubramanian. 2008. How motivation, opportunity, and ability drive 
knowledge sharing: The constraining-factor model. J. of Oper. Management. 26(3) 426-445.  
Staats, BR. 2012. Unpacking Team Familiarity: The Effects of Geographic Location and Hierarchical 
Role. Production and Oper. Management. 21(3) 619-635. 
Tucker, A. L., A. C. Edmondson. 2003. Why hospitals don't learn from failures: organizational and 
psychological dynamics that inhibit system change. California Management Review. 45(2) 55-72. 
Tucker, A. L., I. M. Nembhard, A. C. Edmondson. 2007. Implementing new practices: An empirical 
study of organizational learning in hospital intensive care units. Management Sci. 53(6) 894-907. 
Tukey, J. W. 1977. Exploratory Data Analysis. Reading, MA: Addison–Wesley. 
Tushman, M. L., D. A. Nadler. 1978. Information Processing as an Integrating Concept in 
Organizational Design. Acad. of Management Rev. 3(3) 613-624. 
Van Knippenberg, D., C. K. W. De Dreu, A. C. Homan. (2004). Work group diversity and group 
performance: An integrative model and research agenda. Journal of Applied Psychology 89(6) 
1008–1022. 
Van de Ven, A. H., A. L. Delbecq, R. Koenig Jr. 1976. Determinants of coordination modes within 
organizations. Amer. Sociological Rev. 41(2) 322-338. 
Wegner, D. M. 1986. Transactive memory: A contemporary analysis of the group mind. G. Mullen, G. 
Goethals, eds. Theories of Group Behavior. Springer-Verlag, New York, 185-208. 
Weick, K. E., K. H. Roberts. 1993. Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on flight 
decks. Admin. Sci. Quart. 38(3) 357-381. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Moderating role of task complexity 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Duration 5.657 0.268 3.367 6.768 1         
 
2. Team Familiarity Dispersion 
 
278.197 
 
213.761 
 
0 
 
1097 
 
0.0902** 
 
1        
 
3. Bottleneck-Pair 
 
2.501 
 
1.118 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0.0509** 
 
-0.0267* 
 
1       
 
4. Severe Familiarity Percentage 
 
0.090 
 
0.031 
 
0 
 
0.431 
 
-0.0649** 
 
-0.3273** 
 
0.2116** 
 
1      
 
5. Average Team Familiarity 
 
4.990 
 
1.030 
 
0 
 
6.928 
 
0.0222 
 
0.6274** 
 
0.2910** 
 
-0.4432** 
 
1     
 
6. Individual Average Direct     
    Experience 
5.076 1.376 0 7.227 0.2419** 0.5939** 0.0906** 0.2458** -0.2686** 1 
   
 
7. Team Size 
 
5.414 
 
0.785 
 
3 
 
8 
 
0.0442** 
 
0.0519** 
 
0.3323** 
 
0.0437** 
 
0.0104* 
 
-0.0734** 
 
1   
 
8. Severe 
 
0.283 
 
0.224 
 
0 
 
1 
 
-0.0925** 
 
-0.0365 
 
0.0536* 
 
-0.0907** 
 
0.0638** 
 
-0.2034** 
 
0.0670** 
 
1  
 
9. Mild 
 
0.221 
 
0.421 
 
0 
 
1 
 
-0.0185 
 
-0.0136 
 
0.0157 
 
-0.0165 
 
-0.0162 
 
0.0419** 
 
-0.1159** 
 
-0.1793** 
 
1 
+, * and ** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 2. Regression of Team Familiarity on Surgery Duration 
Variable Duration 
 Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Team Familiarity Dispersion  0.0001**  0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
  (0.0000)    (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   
Bottleneck-Pair    0.0113** 0.0170** 0.0176** 0.0178** 
   (0.0032)   (0.0036)   (0.0036)   (0.0036)   
Severe Familiarity Percentage     -0.4106** -0.4087** 
     (0.1141)   (0.1152)   
Average Team Familiarity -0.0290** -0.0354**   -0.0390**   -0.0413** -0.0460** -0.0425** 
 (0.0092) (0.0120)   (0.0099)   (0.0141)   (0.0142)   (0.0142)   
Average Team Familiarity x Severe      -0.0284*  
      (0.0124)   
Individual Average Direct Experience -0.0676** -0.0675** -0.0703** -0.0515** -0.0470** -0.0481** 
 (0.0114)   (0.0134)   (0.0124)   (0.0144)   (0.0146)   (0.0145)   
Team Size 0.0386** 0.0379** 0.0418** 0.0458** 0.0462** 0.0469** 
 (0.0060)   (0.0061)   (0.0064)   (0.0065)   (0.0065)   (0.0066)   
Severe 0.0243** 0.0237** 0.0250** 0.0243** 0.0243** 0.1614** 
 (0.0043)   (0.0043)   (0.0043)   (0.0043)   (0.0043)   (0.0600)   
Mild -0.0124*  -0.0129*  -0.0112+  -0.0119*  -0.0118*  -0.0114+  
 (0.0060)   (0.0060)   (0.0060)  (0.0060)   (0.0060)   (0.0060)   
Constant 5.3009** 5.3158** 5.2591** 5.2637** 5.2985** 5.2812** 
 (0.0812)   (0.0806)   (0.0822)   (0.0819)   (0.0825)   (0.0827)   
Observations (N) 6128 6128 6128 6128 6128 6128 
Adjusted R2  0.477 0.481 0.481 0.484 0.486 0.487 
Increase in Adjusted R2  0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001* 
BIC -1512.742 -1518.935 -1517.899 -1531.114 -1533.067 -1535.958 
AIC -1700.992 -1707.909 -1712.873 -1732.811 -1741.482 -1751.096 
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lead Surgeon Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of the Week Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
+, * and ** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively  
Table 3. Policy Comparison 
 
  Policy_dispersion Policy_stable 
  
Quarter  
1 
Quarter  
2 
Quarter 
3 
Average 
Quarter 
1 
Quarter  
2 
Quarter 
 3 
Average 
Team Familiarity 
Dispersion 
-22.43% -64.25% -68.56% -51.75% 21.01% 32.82% 22.24% 25.36% 
Average Team Familiarity -19.35% -61.05% -54.91% -45.10% 26.79% 71.43% 68.30% 55.51% 
Bottleneck-Pair 
-1 
(31.35%) 
-3 
(93.17%) 
-3 
(108.77%) 
-2.33 
(77.77%) 
0  
(-8.93%) 
1  
(-41.04%) 
0  
(-22.85%) 
0.33  
(-24.27%) 
Overall Duration -1.06% -4.11% -5.73% -3.63% -1.00% -0.27% -0.14% -0.47% 
